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1. THE PLATT OPNION
A. Introduction
On October 1, 1993, two new statutes went into effect in Florida.
Florida Statutes section 733.617 was amended to award commissions to
personal representatives by calculating a percentage of the probated
estate's value.' Also enacted was section 733.6171, which introduced a
bifurcated fee for the attorney of the personal representative consisting
of a percentage of estate assets, as well as a charge for time expended.2
The committee report notes that the bill introducing these changes "dra-
matically revises the means of determining reasonable compensation for
fiduciaries and attorneys who represent personal representatives in pro-
bate, trust, and guardianship estate matters."3 While the analysis doesn't
explain why these "dramatic" changes were made, it does refer to the
1. Ch. 93-257, § 10, Laws of Fla. (1993).
2. Id. § 4.
3. FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. ON JUDICIARY, BILL ANALYSIS &
ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT OF CS/HB 1295, at 15 (1993).
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1991 Florida Supreme Court opinion, In re Estate of Platt,4 with the
parenthetical comment that the "decision indicates awkwardness in try-
ing to combine the fees of professionals employed by the personal repre-
sentative with the fees of the personal representative."' 5 To begin our
analysis of the new statutes, let us take the suggestion of the staff of the
House Judiciary Committee and focus on what the supreme court said in
Platt.
B. Facts
Lester Platt became incompetent late in life.' A bank and a lawyer
managed his assets under a guardianship agreement, for which they were
fully compensated. Upon Platt's death in March of 1985, the two fiduci-
aries were appointed co-personal representatives of the estate, and they
engaged the lawyer as attorney for the estate. As guardians, the co-
personal representatives were in control of Platt's property, and no mar-
shaling of assets was required to administer Platt's $7 million estate.
Still, they advised Platt's daughters, the beneficiaries, that the personal
representative 7 fees and attorney fees would equal 4.5% of the value of
the estate. One daughter objected to a percentage fee and asked the bank
and the lawyer to maintain time records for their services. Two years
later, the bank and lawyer requested fees of $489,877, or around seven
percent of the estate. The lawyer petitioned for attorney's fees of
$144,300, calculated as two percent of the estate, for 274 hours of work.
This implies an hourly rate of $526.64, which reflected fifty-four hours
apparently expended in pursuit of the fee itself. The lawyer also charged
a PR fee of $92,500. The bank billed $203,077, based on percentages
contained in its published fee schedule, plus an additional $50,000 for
extraordinary services. It is not clear what, if any, time records were
kept by the bank.
C. Trial Court
The parts of the PR fee statute applicable to the Platt case read as
follows:
(1) Personal representatives, attorneys, accountants, and apprais-
ers .. . shall be entitled to reasonable compensation. Reasonable
compensation shall be based on one or more of the following:
(a) The time and labor required ....
4. 586 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1991).
5. FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 3, at 2.
6. Platt, 586 So. 2d at 329. The facts discussed in the text may be found at 329-30.
7. Throughout this comment "personal representative" will be abbreviated as "PR".
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(c) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
services.
(d) The amount involved ....
(3) If the personal representative is a member of The Florida Bar
and has rendered legal services in connection with his official duties,
he shall be allowed a fee therefor, determined as provided in subsec-
tion (1).'
The trial court noted that the requested fees were based on criteria
approved by this statute. The court approved the bank's fee of $203,077
because it was based on a published fee schedule, but it denied the
bank's request for an extra $50,000, finding insufficient evidence for a
claim of extraordinary services. Regarding the attorney's fees, the court
determined that a charge of $144,300, based solely on a percentage of
the estate, was reasonable. The court did, however, reduce the requested
co-personal representative fee from $92,500 to $67,692, an amount
equal to one-third of the bank's fee. Apparently, the judge was con-
vinced by the lawyer's expert witness, who testified that this was the
lowest figure to which the lawyer was entitled.9 In effect, the fees
approved by the court were exclusively calculated as a percentage of the
estate's value.' °
D. Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed, holding that reasonable
compensation under the statute could not be computed solely on the
basis of a fixed percentage of the probate estate.1" Such an approach
had been the law until 1976, when the legislature first adopted the "rea-
sonable compensation" language.1 2 The court reasoned:
If the legislature had desired to set the fees in accordance with a
sliding-percentage scale, plus fees for extraordinary services, it could
have retained or modified the prior statute. It did not do so; rather,
when it amended the statute, it changed from a specific sliding-per-
centage scale for personal representatives to 'reasonable' fees for all
professionals and agents performing services for the estate. 3
The court concluded that the legislature, while rejecting the use of a
8. Platt, 586 So. 2d at 332 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 733.617 (Supp. 1976)).
9. Id. at 330-3 1.
10. Percentage fees are covered by subsection (1)(d) of FLA. STAT. § 733.617 quoted in the
text. Subsection (l)(d) permits compensation to be based on "the amount involved." The
statutory justification for adding a percentage fee for the lawyer's legal services follows from
combining subsection (3) with subsection (1)(d).
11. Platt, 586 So. 2d at 337.
12. Id. at 331.
13. TId. at 335.
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statutorily-defined compensation formulae, did not mean to imply that
professionals and others providing services to an estate could bill in any
manner they saw fit.
[W]e construe [the statute], requiring that reasonable compensation
be based on 'one or more of the following' factors to mean the appli-
cable factor or factors for the particular professional or agent
employed by the estate. . . .Consequently, the factors that would
apply to each category are not the same. We find that it would be
unreasonable to hold that the legislature intended that reasonable fees
could be arrived at by allowing the use of different factors for the
same category of professionals for the same type of service. 14
As an alternative to percentage-based fees, the court discussed the
lodestar method, under which the number of hours reasonably expended
in providing services is multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate for such
services. 15 While commentators differ on whether the court meant to
include personal representatives in this discussion,' 6 there is no doubt
that the court was directing its remarks towards attorneys. Referring to
Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe,'7 the court in Platt drew a com-
parison between workers' compensation and probate by stating that "one
of the primary reasons for the adoption of the 'lodestar' method in Rowe
was the fact that someone other than the client who received the services
would be required to pay the attorney's fees."' 8 The court went on to
quote from its opinion in Standard Guarantee Insurance Co. v. Quan-
strom,19 suggesting that "in estate and trust matters .... the basic lode-
star method of computing a reasonable attorney's fee may be an
appropriate starting point."20
E. Reaction
The Platt opinion came as a great shock to trust bankers and pro-
bate lawyers, since both were accustomed to charging percentage-based
fees. The supreme court had told them that the way they were doing
14. Id. at 336.
15. Id. at 333-34.
16. Compare Nicholas H. Hagoort, Jr., The Legislature Tries to Reverse Platt. Will it Work?,
SOUTH COUNTY ADVOCATE (Palm Beach), Fall 1993, at 9 ("Platt adopted the 'lodestar' method
for the determination of attorney's fees in probate matters ....") with Kathryn G. Benish, The
Lodestar: A Millstone for Fiduciaries and Their Lawyers, PROB. & PROP., May/June 1992, at 36,
37 ("[T]he Florida court held in ... Platt... that fees for personal representatives and lawyers in
probate matters cannot be based solely on a percentage of the value of the estate. Instead, the
court endorsed the 'lodestar' method .....
17. 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).
18. Platt, 586 So. 2d at 333.
19. 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990).
20. Platt, 568 So. 2d at 335.
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business was unlawful. The court endorsed the lodestar method, but it
was still unclear to what extent fees had to be based on billable hours.
The uncertainty spawned numerous fee contests. Judge Penick, the
chief probate judge in Pinellas County, noted that after Platt, 300 to 400
fee challenges were filed every month. 21 By 1993 he was spending over
a third of his time presiding over fee disputes, and still had a backlog of
5000 cases. According to Robert Goldman, the former chairman of the
Florida Bar's Probate and Trust Law Section, hourly charges had
become more costly than percentage fees.
Because the new fees were based on lawyers' time sheets, estate ben-
eficiaries could nit-pick the records if they thought the fee was too
high. But the challengers had to hire experts-other lawyers-to tes-
tify against the estate attorney's fee. Those experts cost more
money.22
While the holding in Platt was obtuse, the court had clearly based its
opinion on legislative intent. From October 1991 when the decision in
Platt was announced till April 1993 when the new fee statutes were
passed, the probate bar and the corporate fiduciary community lobbied
the legislature intensively to help formulate a clearer view of this intent.
Specifically, the Trust Division of the Florida Bankers Association
reacted to Platt by drafting amendments to Florida Statutes section
733.617 for submission to the legislature.23 "The statutory language of
the 1993 amendment is a virtual reenactment of [Florida Statutes sec-
tion] 734.01 (1973), '24 which contained the percentage commission
structure abolished by the legislature effective January 1, 1976. Parallel
to this effort, the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the
Florida Bar formed a committee chaired by the late William Belcher.25
As enacted, Florida Statutes section 733.6171 tracked the language of
the Belcher Committee with slight-but significant-modifications,
which will be discussed below.
II. PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FEES
A. Commission Structure
Florida Statutes section 733.617 entitles a personal representative
to a commission for ordinary services payable from the estate assets
21. Bruce Vielmetti, New Law Can Put Pitfalls in Probate, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 17,
1993, at lB.
22. Id.
23. Rohan Kelley, Statutory Changes in Compensating Attorneys and Personal
Representatives, Oct. 1993, at 4.5, available in Florida LAW/net (draft outline for a Florida Bar
CLE course).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 4.16.
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without order of court.26 While this has been the informal practice in
Florida since enactment of the probate code,27 the supreme court in Platt
interpreted the old statute as "mandat[ing] that an independent judicial
officer set personal representatives' fees."28 Thus the new statute clearly
limits judicial power.
The cornerstone of the new statute is the reenactment of a percent-
age commission based upon the probate estate's value. The commission
is computed as 3% of the first $1 million in assets, 2.5% of the next $4
million, 2% of the next $5 million, and 1.5% of assets over $10 million
in value. 29 Interestingly, under the pre-1976 statute the lowest rate was
2.5%, which applied to all assets above $5000.30 The new statute
awards higher commissions for estates up to $6 million, but lower fees
for larger estates.
In addition to these commissions, the new statute allows compensa-
tion for extraordinary services. These services include selling property,
conducting litigation, operating the decedent's business, and paying
taxes.3' The tax provision represents a change in the pre-1976 statute,
which classified only "extensive or complicated estate or inheritance
taxes" as extraordinary.32 On its face, the language would seem to
expand the base on which a PR can charge fees. However, "[c]orporate
and individual fiduciaries for many years have charged an additional fee
over and above the normal percentage fee for preparation of various tax
returns or have charged the cost of an outside professional. '33 There-
fore, the new language would appear to merely codify existing practice.
By drawing a brighter line, the new statute also eliminates disputes over
what constitutes a "complicated" return and how much work a PR must
perform before the effort may be labeled "extensive."
B. Contracting Out of the Statute
As in previous versions, the new statute allows the testator to affect
the commission structure by will provision or contract. If the will con-
tains a substitute rate or amount, the PR may choose to be paid as pro-
vided in the will or by statute. However, if the decedent contracted for
the services of the PR, the PR is bound by the fee agreement. 34 "Where
26. FLA. STAT. § 733.617(l) (1993).
27. Kelley, supra note 23, at 4.5.
28. Platt, 586 So. 2d at 337.
29. FLA. STAT. § 733.617(2) (1993).
30. Platt, 586 So. 2d at 331 n.4.
31. FLA. STAT. § 733.617(3) (1993).
32. Kelley, supra note 23, at 4.7.
33. Id.
34. FLA. STAT. § 733.617(4) (1993).
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there was a contract, and the personal representative (perhaps because of
a low contract fee) declines to serve, it provides interesting speculation
whether the estate, which must then have a different personal representa-
tive at a presumably higher fee, has a right to damages against the con-
tracting individual."'33 Drawing an analogy to the Change of Law
doctrine, the reneging party might argue that the wholly executory con-
tract represented an attempt to opt out of a previous version of the stat-
ute and, as such, lapsed when the statute it referenced was repealed.36
A new feature of the amended statute prohibits renunciation by the
PR if the amount provided in the will is a reference to the PR's regularly
published schedule of fees in effect at decedent's date of death. 37 This
feature allows professional fiduciaries to compete on the basis of price,
while protecting testator's against bait and switch tactics. Because most
trust banks and other corporate fiduciaries maintain a fee schedule, the
document referenced by the will has significance apart from the effect
upon the disposition made by the will. Therefore, the statute's renuncia-
tion prohibition satisfies the doctrinal requirements of an act of
independent significance under the common law of wills. 38
C. Multiple Personal Representatives
The new statute provides that if the estate's value is $100,000 or
more and there are two representatives, each PR is entitled to a full com-
mission.39 If there are three or more representatives, the PR "who has
possession of and primary responsibility for administration of the
assets"40 receives a full commission, while the other representatives
must share a second commission among themselves. For estates under
$100,000 in value, only one commission is available.4'
It is difficult to reconcile this provision with the logic of the rest of
the statute. If performing the services ordinarily required entitles a sin-
gle PR to a percentage commission, how can the appointment of a sec-
ond PR to perform the exact same services justify a second commission?
As the supreme court said in Platt, "[t]o have a co-personal representa-
tive, who is also the attorney for the estate, receive a co-personal repre-
sentative's fee computed solely on the basis of a percentage of the
35. Kelley, supra note 23, at 4.10.
36. See JOHN T. GAUBATZ ET AL., ESTATES AND TRUSTS: CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS
271 (1989) (discussing the Change of Law doctrine).
37. FLA. STAT. § 733.617(4) (1993).
38. See GAUBATZ ET AL., supra note 36, at 112 (discussing the doctrine of Acts of
Independent Significance).
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corporate fiduciary's co-personal representative's fee is illogical since
the fee has no reasonable relationship to the services performed by the
co-personal representative who serves with the corporate fiduciary."42
The court would thus deny a percentage-based fee to a second PR. Even
accepting the legislature's position that a percentage commission for a
supporting PR makes sense, should it be the same amount as the com-
mission paid to the PR charged with primary responsibility for
shepherding the decedent's assets? In Platt, the probate attorney's own
expert testified that the attorney was entitled to a co-personal representa-
tive's fee equal to one-third to one-half of what the corporate fiduciary
received.43 The legislature should pause to consider the implication of
an expert unable to justify a fee to which the new statute asserts the
attorney, as co-personal representative, is entitled without justification.
A final provision carried over from prior versions of the PR fee
statute allows a PR who is a member of the Florida Bar to receive addi-
tional compensation for legal services rendered for the estate.' This
provision will be discussed below, after examination of the newly
enacted attorney's fee statute.
III. ATrORNEY's FEES
A. Presumed Reasonable Fee Structure
In Platt, the Supreme Court of Florida endorsed the lodestar
method as an appropriate starting point in calculating reasonable attor-
ney's fees, but declared that in no case could a fee be calculated solely
on the basis of a fixed percentage of the value of the estate. What the
court meant is that by comparing these and other methods of fee calcula-
tion, a reasonable amount of compensation could be derived. Upholding
the literal language in Platt, but wreaking havoc with its spirit, newly
enacted Florida Statutes section 733.6171 presumes that a reasonable fee
will result from the sum of the amounts computed under both a percent-
age commission and a lodestar calculation.45
The first part of this bifurcated fee is intended to compensate the
attorney for his responsibilities. It is calculated as two percent of the
value of the probate estate, including income earned during administra-
tion.4 6 If the estate is required to file a federal estate tax return, an addi-
tional one percent of the difference between the value of the gross estate
42. Platt, 586 So. 2d at 337.
43. Id. at 330.
44. FLA. STAT. § 733.617(6) (1993).
45. Id. § 733.6171(3).
46. Id. § 733.6171(3)(a).
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and the value of the probate estate is tacked on.47 The second part of the
fee compensates for the professional time expended by computing the
product of the number of hours reasonably expended and a reasonable
hourly rate for the attorney. 8 A similar calculation is performed in pric-
ing the legal services provided to the estate by paralegals and lawyers
who worked under the supervision of the probate attorney.4 9
Proponents of the dual fee structure argue that the size of the estate
and the complexity of the legal work are independent parameters.50 The
risk of error varies with the size of the estate because in larger estates,
errors are potentially more costly." The amount of time required to
perform the work, however, depends on countless variables that have
little in common with the size of the estate, including the type of assets,
the ease with which the will can be proved, the existence of pretermitted
heirs, and the presence of lapsed bequests to name only a few. Accord-
ing to one probate attorney: "It should be no mystery. .. that the pre-
dictability of the total time required is rather elusive, given the volume,
and the impact, of all of these many variables. 52 Therefore, according
to the dual-fee-structure proponents, a time charge is needed to award
the attorney for the difficulty of the assignment and a percentage com-
mission to compensate for the attorney's responsibility.
There is clearly some validity to this argument. The California
Law Revision Commission noted that one of the advantages of a pure
percentage fee is that "[i]t makes legal services more affordable in small
estates by shifting to larger, more profitable estates some of the over-
head costs of administering smaller estates."'5 3 This sentiment was
echoed by a critic of the Supreme Court of Florida's endorsement of the
lodestar method in Platt. "There could be a negative impact on consum-
ers, and force a lot of those smaller estates out of the market. ' 54 If both
pure methods shift costs-the percentage commission towards the large
estates and the lodestar towards the small estates-than a hybrid
approach can clearly be fairer. However, before accepting the theoreti-
cal superiority of Florida's dual fee structure, it is worth examining the
responsibility for which probate attorneys receive a percentage fee.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 733.6171(3)(b).
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 23, at 4.17.
51. Id. at 4.18.
52. David S. Lande, Explaining Legal Fees for Probate, CASE & COM., July/Aug. 1988, at 32,
40.
53. California Law Revision Comm'n, Tentative Recommendation Relating to Compensation
of Estate Attorney and Personal Representative, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 18, 1988, at 2, 3.
54. Jim Talley, Court Ruling on Fees Rocks Probate System, SUN SENTINEL, May 26, 1991, at
ID (quoting Stewart Marshall, an Orlando lawyer representing the Florida Bankers Association).
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Proponents of the bifurcated fee focus on the possibility of profes-
sional error. While the damages in a malpractice suit may be positively
correlated with the size of the assignment, malpractice insurance rates
vary with the overall volume of work in the office. For each practi-
tioner, malpractice insurance tends to be a fixed amount, which, like any
other overhead cost, can be spread over the base of billable hours. A
second source of risk is the possibility that a dissatisfied personal repre-
sentative will ask that the attorney waive his fee. However, it is a cen-
tral purpose of attorney's fee statutes to mitigate this risk through the
presumption that a fee computed by the statutorily-designated formula is
reasonable, and, therefore, the burden rests with the PR to show other-
wise. For similar reasons, the supreme court in Platt rejected the use of
a contingency risk factor or multiplier in arriving at a reasonable hourly
rate for use in a lodestar formula. "The contingency risk factor .... was
created to compensate attorneys for those cases where there was a risk of
nonpayment. In other words, this factor was added to the' lodestar
formula to compensate attorneys who receive no fees if they do not pre-
vail." Thus, despite the popularity of the responsibility factor in the
Florida probate bar, it seems that the risks probate entail can be accom-
modated by an hourly fee. As one New York probate attorney con-
cluded: "It is no mystery, then,... that the majority of lawyers charge
fees on the basis of time ultimately required to do the job, so that the
client takes the risk of the unknown ...."I'
Perhaps the weakest argument against time charges was attributed
to Robert Goldman, former chairman of the Florida Bar's Probate and
Trust Law Section, who was paraphrased as having said, "[l]awyers felt
the hourly rate was unfair to skillful attorneys who could finish work
quickly while benefitting rookies who needed more time."57 Salary
equalization was not contemplated under the old statute, which, in defin-
ing reasonable compensation, allowed the court to consider "[t]he expe-
rience, reputation, diligence, and ability of the person performing the
services. 58 It would be a sad state of affairs indeed, if an attorney who
was unwilling to publicize his hourly billing rate were allowed to hide
behind a percentage commission formula.
55. Platt, 586 So. 2d at 334 (footnote omitted). Where appropriate, a contingency risk factor
is applied to the reasonable hourly rate derived under the assumption that the attorney will be paid.
Thus if an attorney's reasonable hourly rate is $ 100 and there is a one-third chance of the client
not paying for the legal services rendered, then the rate can be multiplied by a contingency risk
factor of 1.5 to arrive at a "certainty equivalent" fee of $150 per hour. Note that $150 times the
probability of payment (2/3) results in the reasonable hourly rate of $100.
56. Lande, supra note 52, at 40.
57. Janice Heller, Probate Lawyers Said to be Abusing Fee Guidelines, PALM BEACH DAILY
Bus. Rav., Dec. 21, 1993, at A], AlO.
58. Platt, 586 So. 2d at 332 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 733.617(1)(g) (Supp. 1976)).
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B. Rebutting the Presumption
There are three ways in which an attorney can receive compensa-
tion in an amount different from the fee that the statute presumes is
reasonable. First, the attorney and the testator can set a fee by con-
tract.5 9 This contract obligates neither the personal representative to hire
the attorney nor the attorney to accept the representation. If the PR
chooses to engage the attorney, the contract fee serves as a ceiling that
the fee actually paid may not exceed. Second, the attorney, the personal
representative, and the beneficiaries may agree to a different fee, either
explicitly by contract or implicitly by disclosure of the fee variation in a
petition for discharge to which no objection is filed.6"
The third and final way to pay a fee different from the compensa-
tion set by statute is for an interested party to petition the court.6' The
statute contemplates either an increase or a decrease in the ordinary
compensation computed by the hybrid formula. However, since the stat-
ute presumes that the ordinary compensation is reasonable, the burden is
on the petitioner to rebut this presumption.62 In formulating an argu-
ment, the petitioner is given a list of factors to consider, a number of
which are (for the first time in Florida law) specific to the probate pro-
cess. 6 3 These include the nature and value of both the probate and non-
probate assets, the complexity of the work, the novelty of the legal
issues, and the impact of the work on the beneficiaries. 64 In another
change from the old statute which provided for consideration of" 'one
or more' "65 of the stated factors, the new law requires the court to con-
sider "all of the following factors giving such weight to each as it may
determine to be appropriate. 66
In a change from prior law, a "court may [now] determine reason-
able attorney's compensation without receiving expert testimony. 67
While a party may still offer expert testimony, the court is no longer
59. FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(6) (1993).
60. Id. § 733.6171(2).
61. Id. § 733.6171(4).
62. Logically, the beneficiary as the petitioner in a fee challenge must have the burden of
persuasion when the attorney charges the statutorily-presumed reasonable fee or the PR bills the
amount to which he is entitled by statute. This logic is contradicted by the continued existence of
FLA. STAT. § 733.6175, which states that "the reasonableness of such compensation or payment
may be reviewed by the court. The burden of proof . . . [of] the reasonableness of the
compensation shall be upon the personal representative and the person employed by him." It
should be interesting to observe how the courts resolve this statutory conundrum in the future.
63. See Kelley, supra note 23, at 4.24.
64. FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(4) (1993).
65. Platt, 586 So. 2d at 332 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 733.617(1) (Supp. 1976)).
66. FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(4) (1993).
67. Id. § 733.6171(5).
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.required to pay the expert witness from the proceeds of the estate.
Unlike the experts, the attorneys fare better under the new statute. In
Platt, the supreme court held that the attorney's time spent in a fee dis-
pute was not compensable. The new statute reverses that rule.68
C. Selecting a Percentage
1. THE FLORIDA DEBATE
While the Belcher Committee drafted the hybrid structure of the
attorney's fee statute, it did not recommend the figures in the formula as
enacted by the legislature. The committee compared the responsibility
percentage to a lodestar multiplier capped at two, and concluded that
"[t]he fee for responsibility cannot logically exceed ... the amount of
the hourly fee."69  Relying on empirical information on the size of
estates and the amount of time attorneys spend on probating estates of
different sizes, the committee concluded that the desired balance would
be achieved by charging one percent of the value of the probate assets
and one-quarter of one percent of the value of nonprobate assets for
large estates. 70 The committee also recognized that no single figure
would fit all lawyers on all assignments, and that a figure presumed
reasonable should be on the low side. As one member wrote:
[T]he committee opted for a 'low' percentage, designed to fit the
lowest common denominator. If in practice a greater percentage was
appropriate, the lawyer could apply to the court to increase it. We
considered 'human nature' was less likely to seek a reduction if the
applicable percentage was too high, than to seek an increase if the
applicable percentage was too low. 7 1
The probate division of the Palm Beach County Bar Association
opposed the parameters recommended by the Belcher Committee. They
felt that courts would view the percentages as a ceiling; it would be
easier for lawyers to bill less, rather than have to persuade judges that
they deserve to be paid more than the statutorily presumed reasonable
amount.72 "Their spokesmen complained that they often administered
estates having only minimal probate assets but very large nonprobate
assets-often in the form of revocable living trusts as will substitutes. 73
The Palm Beach group recommended to the executive council of the
Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar that the
minimum figure of one percent of the probate assets be doubled and the
68. Id. § 733.6171(7).
69. Kelley, supra note 23, at 4.34.
70. Id. at 4.33.
71. Id. at 32.
72. See Heller, supra note 57, at A10.
73. Kelley, supra note 23, at 4.33.
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suggested one-quarter of one percent of nonprobate assets for large
estates be quadrupled.74
Attempting to compensate legal services for trusts that substitute
for wills through a probate fee statute creates problems of its own. If the
trust beneficiaries are different from the beneficiaries under the will, the
latter will be paying for the legal services that benefit the former. Alter-
natively, the trustee may hire his own attorney and pay him from the
proceeds of the trust. However, this will not prevent the responsibility
formula from kicking in and assessing a charge against the trust assets
payable to the probate attorney. The estate, therefore, will be double
billed.
A far simpler and more effective solution to the problem encoun-
tered by the Palm Beach attorneys would be to rollback the percentages
to the figures recommended by the Belcher Committee 7 5 and to enact
"[a] parallel provision [to] compensate attorneys for trustees during the
initial trust administration of a revocable living trust as a will substi-
tute."76 As proposed by Rohan Kelley, the trust attorney fee statute
would contain an initial test to determine whether the trust in question is
a bona fide will substitute. Thereafter, its provisions would mirror the
probate attorney fee statute, including the bifurcated fee structure and
the percentages recommended by the Belcher Committee.77
2. COMPARISON TO OTHER STATES
In ten states (including Florida) probate attorneys are paid a per-
centage fee determined by statute.78 No state other than Florida adds an
hourly charge to this fee. Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, and Wyoming each
use a sliding percentage scale that levels out at two percent of the value
of the probate assets.79 In Wyoming and Iowa the two percent figure is
reached quickly, and thus is applied to large and small estates. In
Arkansas and Missouri, on the other hand, two percent applies to pro-
74. Id.
75. There may be support for the rollback in the Senate. According to John Lukosky (Senator
Dudley's Legislative Aide), the Senator supported the hybrid structure but not the rates of the
attorney compensation bill he sponsored. The higher percentages were introduced in the House
bill, and were accepted in conference over the Senator's objection. Telephone Interview with
John Lukosky, Legislative Aid (Oct. 18, 1993).
76. Kelley, supra note 23, at 4.35.
77. Id. at 4.35-38.
78. See California Law Revision Commission, supra note 53, at 7, for a list of the nine states
other than Florida. But cf Jonathan G. Blattmacher, Attorneys' Fees in Estate Administration,
N.Y. ST. B.J., Feb., 1991, at 24, 28, for a list of eight states. Blattmacher did not include Iowa on
his list, which may be explained by his introductory signal: "See, e.g."
79. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-48-108 (Michie 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 633.197 to 198
(West 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 473.153 (Vernon 1992); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-7-804 (Supp.
1993).
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bate assets in excess of $1 million, and thus only effects large estates.
After the first $25,000 assets are assessed at a rate of 3% up to a value of
$100,000, 2.75% from $100,000 to $400,000, and 2.5% from $400,000
to $1,000,000. California and Hawaii also use a sliding percentage
scale, starting at 2% and leveling out at 0.5% and 1%, respectively. 80
New Mexico's attorneys receive no commission on real property,
1% on cash and cash equivalents over $5000, and 5% on other person-
alty subject to probate over $3000.81 In Montana, lawyers may charge
3% of the federal estate tax base or the state inheritance tax base in
excess of $40,000, whichever is larger.8 2 In Delaware the personal rep-
resentative and his attorney share a fee of 2.8% applied against commis-
sionable estates in excess of $500,000.3 The commissionable estate is
defined as the sum of the probate estate, one-half of any jointly owned
personalty, and one-half of any realty in which the decedent held an
interest. For purposes of comparison, the commissionable estate can be
thought of as a rough approximation of the federal estate tax base of a
married decedent.
Relying on the Belcher Committee's empirical work, the hourly
charge applied in Florida can conservatively be estimated at 1% of the
probate assets and .25% of the nonprobate assets.84 Since the responsi-
bility component as enacted is 2% of the probate assets and 1% of the
nonprobate assets, Florida's attorney's fees can be represented on a pure
commission basis as 3% of the probate assets and 1.25% of the nonpro-
bate assets. Consequently, the compensation presumed reasonable for
probate attorneys in Florida far exceeds the level set by eight of the nine
other states which employ a statutory percentage commission. The only
state where attorneys may charge more than in Florida is Montana. Tak-
ing into account the distribution of estates by size, it is, however, quite
possible that the median estate in Montana pays a substantially lower
commission than the median estate in Florida. 5
80. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 10810 (West 1991); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 560:3-719, 721 (1993).
81. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-3-719, 720 (Michie 1993).
82. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-3-631, 633 (1993).
83. DEL. CODE ANN. Rule 192 (1991).
84. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
85. Montana's median household income in 1989 of $22,988 ranked 44th among the 50
states. Florida, with a median household income of $27,483, ranked 28th. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1993, xix (113th ed. 1993). Since, on
average, Floridian households are wealthier than Montanan households, the average size of estates
in Florida will be larger than in Montana.
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IV. COMBINING PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FEES AND ATTORNEY
COMPENSATION
A. Overview
A number of interesting points emerge in a comparison of the Flor-
ida attorney and PR fee statutes. First, while probate attorneys must
account for their time, personal representatives need not keep track of
the time they spend working on the estate. Second, a PR has a right to
the percentage commission, while the attorney is allowed a statutory
percentage and an hourly fee if uncontested. Third, while both attorneys
and personal representatives deal with probate and nonprobate assets, 6
only the attorney's compensation takes the nonprobate assets into
account.
Focusing on this last point, it is often the case that significant time
and effort may be spent by both the attorney and the PR on administer-
ing property passing by right of survivorship, homestead exemption,
trust, insurance, annuity, or appointment power. This property is not
part of the probate inventory and therefore does not effect the personal
representative's commission. The attorney, on the other hand, is com-
pensated for time spent on the estate. Additionally, if the estate exceeds
$600,000 in value and thus must file a federal estate tax return, the attor-
ney is entitled to a one percent responsibility fee on the excess of the
estate value over the probate value.8 7 Furthermore, in a fee challenge,
the court must explicitly take into account the "nature and value of the
assets that are affected by the decedent's death"88 as well as the "nature
of the probate, nonprobate, and exempt assets"8 9 in setting reasonable
compensation for the attorney. Although it is true that the PR is allowed
compensation for extraordinary services, nonprobate assets are not men-
tioned in the list of specific criteria to consider. 90
B. Attorneys as Personal Representatives
As mentioned above, the PR fee statute continues the practice of
permitting probate attorneys to serve as personal representatives and col-
86. Because the personal representative's authority emanates for the probate court, his legal
responsibilities are limited to the probate proceedings. However, the family of the decedent often
expects that the PR will coordinate all the affairs of the estate. These invariably involve such
mundane matters as arranging for burial, cleaning out a residence, paying debts, and closing
accounts. Also, as a practical matter, the attorney and the family will direct any questions
concerning nonprobate assets to the PR.
87. FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(3)(a) (1993).
88. Id. § 733.6171(4)(c).
89. Id. § 733.6171(4)(g).
90. See id. § 733.617(3).
19951
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
lect fees for both positions. 91 Before October 1, 1993, the court had full
authority to adjust either fee, so this provision was not particularly
troublesome. "Now, with a statutory fixed and unadjustable percentage-
based fee for serving as personal representative as well as a [presumed
reasonable] statutory percentage and hourly fee ... for serving as attor-
ney ... the opportunity for abuse is substantially increased. ' 92 This
feature of the new law seems to have been unintended. Senator Fred
Dudley, one of the bill's sponsors, blames the Florida Banker's Associa-
tion for the oversight and would now like to add a provision for a hear-
ing to the PR fee statute.93 Representative John Cosgrove, the House
sponsor, is concerned about lawyers who are paid twice for performing
the same work, and has asked the Florida Bar to recommend changes. 94
The probate bar has responded with a proposed amendment to the rules
of professional conduct concerning conflict of interest and prohibited
transactions. 95 The proposal would require lawyers who also serve as
personal representatives to tell testators in writing that they will be able
to collect two fees from the estate.96 Interestingly, California, which
pays percentage commissions to both attorneys and personal representa-
tives, allows an attorney who serves as PR only one fee unless the dece-
dent's will expressly authorizes the payment of both fees.97
C. Ethical Considerations
Despite academic challenges on grounds of ethics, efficiency, and
equity, statutory percentage formulas are employed by one-half of the
91. Id. § 733.617(6).
92. Kelley, supra note 23, at 4.11.
93. See Bill Douthat, New Florida Probate Law Bad for Consumers, Foes Say, PALM BEACH
POST, Sept. 30, 1993, at IA, 8A.
94. See Heller, supra note 57, at A 10.
95. Kelley, supra note 23, at 4.11.
96. Heller, supra note 57, at A10. As currently drafted, the Rules of Professional Conduct are
silent on the potential for abuse created by attorneys who are appointed personal representatives
and then hire themselves to probate the estate. The comment to Rule 4-1.7, Conflict of Interest,
points out that "[i]n Florida, the personal representative is the client rather than the estate or the
beneficiaries." Therefore, as far as the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar are concerned, the
attorney owes the beneficiaries no special duty. This fact might surprise testators who named the
lawyer who prepared their will as their PR. Rohan Kelley has suggested that, given the potential
for uncontrolled double billing under the new fee statutes, Rule 4-1.8 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, "Conflict of Interest; Prohibited Transactions," be amended to address this issue. As
proposed, the attorney will be required to advise the client in writing that once the attorney is
appointed as PR he may retain himself to probate the estate, and that he may collect both an
attorney's fee and a PR fee. The proposal also requires that the attorney advise the client of the
impact of the fee statutes by estimating the amount, or giving the formula for how much the
attorney can recover from the estate for his services. Kelley, supra note 23, at 4.11-13. I would
add to this proposal that the attorney also be required to advise the client that it is permissible to
negotiate a lower fee.
97. California Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 53, at 5.
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states in compensating personal representatives 98 and by ten states in
awarding attorney's fees.99 Constitutional challenges by beneficiaries
on due process and equal protection grounds have been unsuccessful, 100
not withstanding the fact that no commission formula will result in rea-
sonable fees in all cases given the diversity and complexity of probate
assignments. The Platt case serves as an excellent example of the kind
of mischief percentage-based fees can cause. As discussed above, Platt
involved a bank and a lawyer that together billed triple-dipping' 0' fees
of close to one-half million dollars to probate a routine estate whose
assets were already under their control.
In hearing Platt, the supreme court chose to limit its enquiry to the
intent of the legislature in defining reasonable compensation for per-
sonal representatives and their attorneys. Not mentioned in the case,
however, is the court's own authority to regulate the practice of law in
Florida, and the limit this authority places on the power of the legislature
to set fees.
Article 5, section 15 of the Florida Constitution vests the supreme
court with exclusive jurisdiction to discipline members of the Florida
bar for ethics violations. Under this constitutional authority, the
supreme court has promulgated the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.
Included therein, under the Rules of Professional Conduct, is a rule reg-
ulating fees for legal services, which states that "[a] fee is clearly exces-
sive when ... after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence
would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee exceeds a
reasonable fee for services provided."' 2 Among the various actions
contemplated under the Rules of Discipline for charging excessive fees
are forfeiture of fees or restitution. Thus, "the excessive amount of the
fee may be ordered returned to the client"'1 3 or "the respondent may be
ordered or agree to pay restitution to a claimant or other person."'0 4 It
98. Id. at 4. See generally THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRUST AND ESTATE COUNSEL, FEES
OF EXECUTORS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND TESTAMENTARY TRUSTEES (1993).
99. See California Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 53, at 7.
100. See Catalina Sugayan, Abandoning Ad Valorem Estate Administration Charges, 7 PROB.
L.J. 33, 53-56 (1985).
101. Cf. John D. McKinnon, Court Restricts Lawyers' Probate Fees, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1991, at 5B ("[T]wo of Platt's children said they saw no reason for the attorney to collect
such a huge sum for handling a relatively simple, straightforward estate."). The triple dip results
from the lawyer and the bank each charging a personal representative fee, the lawyer charging
both a personal representative and an attorneys' fee, and the bank charging additional fees for
extraordinary services. Kelley uses the term "double dip" to describe members of the Florida Bar
who act as personal representatives and then hire themselves as attorneys for the same estate,
thereby allowing themselves to charge twice. Kelley, supra note 23, at 4.11.
102. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.5(a).
103. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(h).
104. R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 3-5.1(i).
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remains to be seen whether a fee challenge by a personal representative
or a beneficiary against an attorney who charged a fee presumed reason-
able by Florida Statutes section 733.6171 could succeed by charging the
attorney with an ethics violation.
Lest the preceding discussion be viewed as mere theoretical mus-
ings, it should be noted that reports of unethical conduct under the new
law are already appearing. Judge Penick "has received requests from
attorneys who want to withdraw petitions for fees so that they can reap-
ply under the new statute."'10 5 In one such case, an attorney who
requested $200,000 under a Platt lodestar calculation now asserts that a
$600,000 fee is reasonable. 106 Furthermore, Sam Smith, attorney for the
beneficiaries in Platt, has collected anecdotal evidence that some law-
yers are misrepresenting the law to their clients by telling them that the
statute mandates how much they charge. 10 7
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has shown that the new statutes setting fees for per-
sonal representatives and their attorneys were enacted in response to
Platt. In Platt, the Supreme Court of Florida held that reasonable com-
pensation could not be computed solely on the basis of a fixed percent-
age of the probate estate. The legislature responded by writing
percentage-based fee formulae into both the personal representative and
the attorney compensation statutes. These statutes were drafted by inter-
est groups who did not coordinate their efforts. Thus, the Trust Division
of the Florida Bankers Association designed the PR commission struc-
ture, and the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the Flor-
ida Bar wrote the attorney's fee statute.
As under prior law, two co-personal representatives may each bill a
full fee and a member of the Florida bar can serve as personal represen-
tative and hire himself to probate the will. New, however, is a provision
which treats the PR fee as a commission to which the personal represen-
tative is entitled without order of court. Also new is the structure of the
attorney's fee that includes a component for professional time expended
charged on the basis of billable hours, a fee for the attorney's responsi-
bility calculated as a percentage of the estate's value, and a presumption
that the sum of the two charges is reasonable.
In setting the parameters for the attorney responsibility fee, the
Palm Beach County Bar Association convinced the legislature to
increase the percentage figures selected by the Real Property, Probate
105. Heller, supra note 57, at A10.
106. Id.
107. Id. at AI.
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and Trust Law Section. The Palm Beach attorneys were concerned
because their affluent clients made greater use of revocable inter vivos
trusts as will substitutes, leaving only household goods and miscellane-
ous financial assets to make up the probate estate. As a result of the
decision to increase the percentages to cover the trust problem, Florida's
statutory probate attorney's fees are the highest in the nation, with the
possible exception of Montana.
The combination of the high fees, the ease with which multiple
commissions may be assessed, and the presumption that compensation
computed under the statutes is reasonable, significantly increases the
possibility that estates will be charged excessive fees by personal repre-
sentatives and their attorneys.
But the power of the legislature is not limitless. The constitution's
exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the supreme court to discipline mem-
bers of the Florida Bar for violations of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct, and the power of the probate courts to supervise the actions taken
by personal representatives on behalf of probate estates, might well be
sufficient to create causes of action against lawyers and personal repre-
sentatives as fiduciaries, with restitution of the excessive fees to the ben-
eficiary constituting the judicial remedy. It remains to be seen how and
to what extent the Florida judiciary asserts this power in the future.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
This Comment was written in early 1994. Since then, the fee stat-
utes enacted in 1993 have been extensively discussed and critiqued.
Particularly scathing were the attacks leveled by Jeffrey Good, an edito-
rial writer for the St. Petersburg Times.10 8 Stung by the public outcry,
members of the probate bar began discussing how they should respond.
In a letter to fellow probate lawyers, Rohan Kelley suggested that the
new statute be amended:
[T]he statute came under substantial media attack, and active attack
from the probate judiciary, and the image of the Bar and the probate
lawyer has, in some instances, been tarnished as a result .... [A]
serious attempt was made in the last legislature to repeal all refer-
108. See Jeffrey Good, A License to Steel, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 7, 1993, at ID ("Your
legislature just gave unethical lawyers and bankers a license to rob their most helpless clients: the
dead.... Rep. John F. Cosgrove, D-Miami, said he introduced the law at the request of-you'll
never guess-the Florida Bar and the Florida Bankers Association .... Cosgrove, who holds
himself out as a friend of the elderly, should be ashamed. So should the rest of the Legislature,
which passed this bill in March [1993] with barely a whisper of debate."); see also Jeffrey Good,
A License to Steal, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 28, 1994, at 5D ("In Florida, it's perfectly legal
to rob an estate. All lawyers and bankers have to do is belly up to the trough our elected
representatives built for them."). See generally Moving Toward Probate Reform, ST. PETERSBURG
TiMEs, Dec. 11, 1994, at ID; Reform Probate Now, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Apr. 3, 1995, at 8A.
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ences to a presumptively reasonable percentage attorney's fee.... I
have every reason to believe it will be introduced again this year,
with at least as good a chance, if not better, of passing. We need to
offer our own alternative.' 0 9
In this letter, Kelley also took the opportunity to defend the fee statute
and the billing practices of the probate bar:
F.S. § 733.6171, our present attorney's fee statute... is a monumen-
tal step forward (beyond the Platt case). . . .I have criticized the
present statute, but only in one particular area. Most of you know it
is my opinion that the 2% (plus 1%) presumptions are too frequently
excessive. For several months now, I have begun informally survey-
ing groups of lawyers regarding the fees they charge in probate
administration matters. As I would expect, I find that most of my
colleagues, those who practice substantially in this area (such as
yourself), charge and collect a fee less [than] that [which] is pre-
sumed to be reasonable by the statute. However, the real shock is
that I have also found that lawyers who are not "probate specialists"
normally charge the presumed reasonable' fee. This results in a true
anomaly-the specialist charges less than the non-specialist for the
same service.''o
This argument became the rallying cry of the Florida probate bar.
In response to the editorial attacks in the St. Petersburg Times, Bruce
Marger, the current chair of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law
Section of the Florida Bar, wrote "[w]e find that the fee statute is misun-
derstood and is not being used by experienced estate practitioners.
Attorneys who are not estate practitioners may be using it to set higher-
than-ordinary fees. The probate bar will propose legislation to remedy
this situation.""'
The centerpiece of the proposal submitted by the bar to the legisla-
ture was the abandonment of the billable hour component of the bifur-
cated attorney fee, and the rescue of the presumed reasonable fee with a
table of declining percentages similar to the personal representative's
commission. In the words of their chief media critic, Jeffrey Good, the
bar's position was as follows:
Two years ago, the Legislature gave Florida lawyers an outrageous
pay hike. In addition to charging an hourly wage for handling a
deceased person's estate, lawyers can charge an extra 2 percent of the
estate's value. Bar leaders now acknowledge that unscrupulous law-
yers have used the law to inflate fees without doing any extra work.
109. Letter from Rohan Kelley to prominent members of the Florida probate bar 2 (July 28,
1994) (on file with the author).
110. Id. at 1.
I l1. Bruce Marger, No One Solution Fits Everyone, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 18, 1994, at
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Smarting from public criticism, they are asking lawmakers to create a
flat rate fee system.112
Essentially, the probate bar's position was to admit that the bifurcated
attorney fee statute enacted in 1993 led to abuses. These abuses, how-
ever, were the result of general practitioners charging excessive hours
because they lacked the experience of the probate specialist, who could
get the job done in less time. Logically therefore, it made sense to drop
the hourly component of the fee, thus curbing the abuses.
The irony of this argument is that the bifurcated fee structure was
introduced because the Supreme Court of Florida had held in Platt that
reasonable compensation could not be computed solely on the basis of a
fixed percentage of the probate estate. Of course the solution proposed
by the bar directly violates the holding in Platt. This contradiction can
only be eliminated by recognizing that the supreme court based its deci-
sion in Platt on legislative intent and not ethical or constitutional princi-
ples. Therefore, despite the ringing endorsement of the lodestar method
in estate and trust matters articulated by the supreme court in Platt, the
legislature was entitled to change its mind.
And so it did. On June 18, 1995, Senate Bill 1378 became law
without the Governor's signature," 3 and was designated Session Law
Chapter Number 95-401." 4 Under this law, the presumed reasonable
compensation for ordinary services performed by the attorney retained
by the personal representative is calculated as a straight percentage of
the value of the probate estate, including income earned by the estate
during administration." 5  This percentage declines as the estate
increases in size. Specifically, the attorney fee is set at 3% of the first
$1 million of the estate, 2.5% of the next $2 million, 2% of the next $2
million, 1.5% of the next $5 million, and 1% of the probate estate over
$10 million in value." 16
This structure is remarkably similar to that of the personal represen-
tative's commission, which remains computed in the same manner as
before." 7 Also remaining intact are the provisions of the PR commis-
sion statute permitting co-personal representatives to charge two full
fees and permitting a personal representative who performs legal serv-
112. Jeffrey Good, Reforming Florida's Probate System, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 26,
1995, at ID.
113. Ch. 95-401, Laws of Fla. (1995).
114. See DIVISION OF STATUTORY REVISION, DIGEST OF GENERAL LAWS ENACTED BY THE 1995
REGULAR SESSION OF THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE, at 27 (1995).
115. Ch. 95-401, § 2, Laws of Fla. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(3) (1995)).
116. Id. Note that on the first $100,000 of assets, the fee under the new law is front loaded so
that the effective rate on estates valued under $100,000 is higher than three percent.
117. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
1995]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ices for the estate to charge both an attorney's fee and a personal repre-
sentative's commission.
New, however, is a statute creating a presumed reasonable trust
attorney's fee. Under this new statute, a fee of seventy-five percent of
the rate set by the probate attorney's fee schedule is presumed reason-
able compensation for an attorney retained by a trustee of a revocable
trust for ordinary services provided following the settlor's death. '18 The
fee is to be calculated based upon the value of the trust assets immedi-
ately following the settlor's death and the income earned by the trust
during initial administration." 9
Under the statute enacted in 1993, a probate attorney was presumed
to act reasonably if he charged the sum of an hourly fee for time
expended, 2% of the value of the probate estate and 1% of the nonpro-
bate assets included in the gross estate for federal tax purposes. Earlier,
this author argued that this formula could be approximated on a pure
commission basis as 3% of the probate assets and 1.25% of the nonpro-
bate assets.1 2 1 Comparing this approximation of the old statute with the
newly enacted law, it is interesting to note that for probate estates up to
$1 million in assets, the attorney may reasonably charge the same 3%.
For larger estates the percentages under the new law drop, thus constitut-
ing a decrease in the presumed reasonable fee. However, the trust attor-
ney's fee calculated at 75% of what a probate attorney could reasonably
charge, substantially exceeds the 1.25% estimated above as allowable
under the 1993 statute for all but the largest trusts. Thus, for example,
the attorney retained by the trustee can reasonably charge 2.25% (75%
of 3%) of the value of trust assets up to $1 million under the new
approach. In fact, it is not until the trust reaches $14.25 million in assets
that the fee under the new law equals the 1.25% that an attorney might
charge as the pure commission equivalent of the 1993 statute. 12'
It is the opinion of this author that, on balance, the new statute
represents an increase in the attorney's fee presumed reasonable under
Florida law. While it is true that lawyers are giving up the billable hour
118. Ch. 95-401, § 4, Laws of Fla. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 737.2041(3)).
119. Id. "Initial trust administration" is defined in FLA. STAT. § 737.2041(10) (1995).
120. See supra notes 69 and 85 and accompanying text.
121. Let "x" be the size of the trust for which the fee under the old and new fee structures is
equivalent. The fee can be algebraically represented as 1.25%(x) under the old statute, and under






Setting the two sides of the equation equal and solving for "x" results in $14,250,000.
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component of the old structure, they are gaining a higher percentage
commission on the first $3 million of probate assets equal to $20,000 in
compensation. 122 While the amount of time required to probate an estate
does increase with the size of the estate, the number of hours to be
expended are limited by economies of scale. Put simply, the amount of
time it takes to write out a check to a beneficiary for $1 million doesn't
double when the check to be written increases to $2 million. It is thus
quite possible that probate attorneys may have lost less in fees by giving
up the time component than the $20,000 in commissions gained on
estates in the $3 to $5 million range. Furthermore, there is little doubt
that the new trust attorney's fee statute represents a sizeable increase
over the responsibility component of the old probate attorney fee statute
applicable to nonprobate assets. When this fact is considered in combi-
nation with the prevalence of trusts as will substitutes in estate planning
for wealthy clients and with the diminished significance of the time
component in larger estates due to economies of scale, it is apparent that
the legislature has increased the presumptively reasonable amount that
an attorney may charge an estate for ordinary services.
One of the advantages of the declining percentage tables used in
computing both personal representative and attorney fees under the new
scheme is that the only independent variable required to compute the
presumed reasonable fee is the size of the estate. For example, taking
the facts in Platt, we can use the tables to compute what two personal
representative fees and one attorney's fee would amount to on a $7 mil-
lion estate. Remarkably, the resulting figure is $490,000, exactly the
amount originally billed by the bank and the lawyer who were guardians
of Lester Platt's property.123 This author finds it difficult to explain how
a figure that was outrageous and exorbitant when originally charged
could be presumed legally reasonable today.
Procedurally, the probate bar suggested two changes in the attorney
fee provisions that were enacted. The first change involved fee disputes.
122. Under the old statute lawyers could charge 2% of the probate assets. Under the new
statute they may reasonably charge 3% for the first $1 million of assets and 2.5% on the next $2
million. That increase is worth $20,000.
123. The bank and the lawyer were co-personal representatives of Platt's estate. Under FLA.
STAT. § 733.617(5) (1993) they are each entitled to charge the full commission. The lawyer, as
the attorney for the estate, is entitled under FLA. STAT. § 733.617(6) (1993) to charge separately
for these legal services. Each PR commission under FLA. STAT. § 733.617(2) (1993) is 3% for the
first $1 million, 2.5% for the next $4 million, and 2% for the last $2 million. That amounts to
$170 thousand for each PR, or $340 thousand for both. Under the latest attorney's fee statute.
Ch. 95-401, § 2, Laws of Fla. (amending FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(3) (1995)), the lawyer may bill
3% for the first $1 million, 2.5% for the next $2 million, 2% for the next $2 million, and 1.5% for
the last $2 million--or $150 thousand. The grand total the bank and the lawyer may charge as a
presumed reasonable fee is thus $490 thousand.
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In Platt, the supreme court had held that the attorney's time spent in a
fee dispute was not compensable. As discussed above, the legislature
reversed that holding outright in 1993.124 Under the new legislation, the
time spent in the dispute is still compensable "unless the court finds the
request for attorney's fees to be substantially unreasonable." 12 5 The sec-
ond change involves the addition of a disclosure provision under which
"[t]he amount and manner of determining compensation for attorneys
and personal representatives must be disclosed in the final accounting,
unless the disclosure is waived in writing signed by the parties bearing
the impact of the compensation and filed with the court."' 26 By bringing
fees into the open, this latter provision should engender some lively dis-
cussion between trust bankers and attorneys on one side and benefi-
ciaries on the other.
In 1993, the Trust Division of the Florida Bankers Association
drafted the changes to the personal representative commission statute,
and the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar
wrote the new attorney fee statute.' 27 In 1995, the changes were drafted
by the bar without input from the bankers. Two procedural provisions in
the new legislation reflect this change in authorship. The first provision
involves the practice of double dipping, under which probate attorneys
also serve as personal representatives and collect fees for both positions.
By introducing the personal representative commission as an entitlement
and pronouncing the attorney fee provisions as presumptively reason-
able, the legislature in 1993 severely limited the courts ability to control
abuses in this practice. 28 Rather than curbing the practice itself, the
probate bar chose to assist the courts in policing abuses by adding a fee
challenge provision to the personal representative statute, under which
an interested person may petition the court for an increase or decrease in
the commission. 129 Given the mischief it was intended to address, the
new provision is breathtakingly overinclusive.
The second provision reflecting the new legislation's authorship is
found in the trust attorney's fee statute. Today, trust bankers rarely hire
independent outside counsel to provide routine legal services, as many
banks have engaged sufficient numbers of lawyers as employees to pro-
vide these services more cost effectively to their clients. Perhaps to
ensure that these cost savings are passed on to these clients rather than
124. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
125. The quoted language was added to FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(7) (1993) which, as
renumbered, is now to be found at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(8).
126. Ch. 95-401, § 2, Laws of Fla. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.6171(9)).
127. See Kelley, supra note 23, at 4.5, 4.16.
128. Id. at 4.11.
129. Ch. 95-401, § 1, Laws of Fla. (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.617(7)).
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letting them accrue to the banks and their stockholders, the trust attor-
ney's fee statute contains a narrow exclusion. Specifically this exclu-
sion states that "[w]hen a corporate fiduciary is serving as trustee ... the
presumptive fee for ordinary [legal] services ...shall not apply."1 30
According to Michael Dribin, a probate attorney who serves as Treas-
urer of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the Florida
Bar, this exclusion has infuriated the trust banking community.3
Whether and when the bankers will suggest legislative changes of
their own remains to be seen. However, even in its absence, this author
regretfully predicts that the process of determining compensation for
personal representatives and probate attorneys in Florida will be rife
with conflict for years to come.
JoHN A. MYER
130. Id. § 4 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 733.2041(5)).
131. Telephone Interview with Michael Dribin, Treasurer of Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law Section of the Florida Bar (Aug. 3, 1995).
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